Robustifying learnability by Robert J. Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs 




























Robert J. Tetlow and Peter von zur Muehlen  
2005-58 
 
NOTE:  Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) 
are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.  The 
analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate 
concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors.  
References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than 
acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character 
of these papers. Robustifying Learnability
Robert J. Tetlow∗ Peter von zur Muehlen†
November 2005.
Abstract
In recent years, the learnability of rational expectations equilibria (REE) and de-
terminacy of economic structures have rightfully joined the usual performance criteria
among the sought-after goals of policy design. Some contributions to the literature,
including Bullard and Mitra (2001) and Evans and Honkapohja (2002), have made
signiﬁcant headway in establishing certain features of monetary policy rules that facil-
itate learning. However a treatment of policy design for learnability in worlds where
agents have potentially misspeciﬁed their learning models has yet to surface. This pa-
per provides such a treatment. We begin with the notion that because the profession
has yet to settle on a consensus model of the economy, it is unreasonable to expect
private agents to have collective rational expectations. We assume that agents have
only an approximate understanding of the workings of the economy and that their
learning the reduced forms of the economy is subject to potentially destabilizing per-
turbations. The issue is then whether a central bank can design policy to account for
perturbations and still assure the learnability of the model. Our test case is the stan-
dard New Keynesian business cycle model. For diﬀerent parameterizations of a given
policy rule, we use structured singular value analysis (from robust control theory) to
ﬁnd the largest ranges of misspeciﬁcations that can be tolerated in a learning model
without compromising convergence to an REE.
In addition, we study the cost, in terms of performance in the steady state of a
central bank that acts to robustify learnability on the transition path to REE. (Note:
This paper contains full-color graphics)
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01 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that policy rules–and in particular, monetary policy rules–should
not be chosen solely on the basis of their performance in a given model of the economy. There
is simply too much uncertainty about the true structure of the economy to warrant taking
the risk of so narrow a criterion for selection. Rather, policy should be designed to operate
"well" in a wide range of models. There has been substantial progress in a relatively short
period of time in the literature on robustifying policy. The ﬁrst strand of the literature
examines the performance of rules given the presence of measurement errors in either model
parameters or unobserved state variables.1 The second strand focuses on comparing rules in
rival models to see if their performance spanned reasonable sets of alternative worlds.2 The
third considers robustifying policy against unknown alternative worlds, usually by invoking
robust control methods.3
At roughly the same time, another literature was developing on the learnability (or E-
stability) of models.4 The learnability literature takes a step back from rational expectations
and asks whether the choices of uninformed private agents could be expected to converge on a
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) as the outcome of a process of learning. Important
early papers in this literature include Bray [5], Bray and Savin [6] and Marcet and Sargent
[33]. Evans and Honkapohja summarize some of their many contributions to this literature
in their book [17].
The question arises: could monetary policy help or hurt private agents learn the REE?
The common features of the robust policy literature include, ﬁrst, that it is the government
that does not understand the true structure of the economy, and second, that the govern-
ment’s ignorance will not vanish simply with the collection of more data.5 By contrast, in the
1 Brainard [4] is the seminal reference. Among the many, more recent references in this large literature
are Sack [40], Orphanides et al. [38], Soderstrom [42] and Ehrmann and Smets [16].
2 See, e.g., Levin et al. [28] and [29].
3 Hansen and Sargent [26] and [27], Tetlow and von zur Muehlen [46] and Coenen [13]. These strands of
the robustness literature are named in the text in chronological order but the three methods should be seen
as complementary rather than substitutes.
4 In this paper, as in most of the rest of the literature, the terms learnability, E-stability and stability
under learning will all be used interchangeably. These terms are distinct from stable—without the "E-" or
"under learning" added—which should be taken to mean saddle-point stable. The term saddle-point stable,
determinate and regular are taken as equivalent adjectives describing equilibria.
5 The concept of "truth" is a slippery one in learning models. In some sense, the truth is jointly determined
by the deep structural parameters of the economy and what people believe them to be. Only in steady state,
and then only under some conditions, will this be solely a function of deep parameters and not of beliefs.
1learning literature it is usually the private sector that is assumed not to have the information
necessary to form rational expectations, but this situation has at least the prospect of being
alleviated with the passage of time and the collection of more data. In this paper, we take
the robust policy rules literature and marry it with the learnability literature.
Since the profession has been unable to agree on a generally acceptable workhorse model
of the economy, it is unreasonable to expect private agents to have rational expectations
a ta l lp o i n t si nt i m e . T h em o s tt h a to n ec a ne x p e c ti st h a ta g e n t sh a v ea na p p r o x i m a t e
understanding of the workings of the economy and that they are on a transition path toward
learning the true structure. And as Evans and McGough [21] show, designing policy as if
the process of learning has already been completed can result in indeterminacy or unstable
equilbria. So we retain the assumption of adaptive learning that is common with most
contributions to this literature.
If the presumption of rational expectations is questionable, and the hazards of learning
cannot be ignored, then from a policy perspective, it follows that the job of facilitating the
transition to REE is logically prior to the job of maximizing the performance of the economy
once the transition is complete. In this paper, we consider two issues. The ﬁrst is how a
policy maker might choose policy to maximize the set of worlds inhabited by private agents
that are able to learn the REE. The second is an assessment of the welfare cost of assuring
learnability in terms of forgone stability in equilibrium. Or, put diﬀerently, we measure
the welfare cost of learnability insurance. Each of these questions is important. In worlds
of model uncertainty, an ill-chosen policy rule—or policy maker—could lead to explosiveness
or indeterminacy. At the same time, excessive concern for learnability will imply costs in
terms of forgone welfare.
Ours is not the ﬁrst paper to consider the issue of choosing monetary policies for their
ability to deliver determinacy and learnability. Bernanke and Woodford [2] argue that
inﬂation-forecast-based (IFB) policy rules—that is, rules that feed back on forecasts of future
output or inﬂation—can lead to indeterminacy in linear rational expectations (LRE) models.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler [11] show that violation of the so-called Taylor principle in the
Nevertheless, in this paper, when we refer to a "true model" or "truth" we mean the REE upon which
successful learning eventually converges.
2context of an IFB rule may have been the source of the inﬂation of the 1970s.6 Bullard
and Mitra [8] in an important paper show that higher persistence in instrument setting—
meaning a large coeﬃcient on the lagged instrument in a Taylor-type rule—can facilitate
determinacy in the same class of models. Evans and Honkapohja [19] note similar problems
in a wider class of rules and argue for feedback on structural shocks, although questions
regarding the observability of such shocks leave open the issue of whether such a policy is
implementable. Evans and McGough [21] compute optimal simple rules conditional on their
being determinate in rival models. Each of these papers makes an important contribution to
the literature, but all are special cases within broader sets of policy choices. In this paper,
we follow a somewhat diﬀerent approach and consider the design of policies to maximize
learnability of the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section lays out the theory,
beginning with a review of the literature on least-squares learnability and determinacy, and
following with methods from the robust control literature. Section 3 introduces the models
with which we work, beginning with the case of the very simple Cagan model of money
demand in hyperinﬂations and then moving on to the New Keynesian business cycle (NKB)
model. For the NKB model, we study the design of time-invariant simple monetary policy
rules to robustify learnability of three types: a lagged-information rule, a contemporaneous
information rule and a forecast-based policy rule. We close the section by covering the
insurance cost of robustifying learnability. A fourth and ﬁnal section sums up and concludes.
2 Theoretical overview
2.1 Expectational equilibrium under adaptive learning
The theory of E-stability or learnability in linear rational expectations models dates back
more than 20 years to Bray [5] who showed that agents using recursive least squares would,
if the arguments to their regressions were properly speciﬁed, eventually converge on the
correct REE. This convergence property gave a considerable shot in the arm to rational
6 Levin et al. [29] and Batini and Pearlman [1] study the robustness properties of diﬀerent types of
inﬂation-forecast based rules for their stability and determinacy properties.
3expectations applications since proponents had an answer to the question "how could people
come to have rational expectations?" The theory has been advanced by the work of Marcet
and Sargent [33] and Evans and Honkapohja [various]. Our rendition follows Evans and
Honkapohja [17], chapters 8-10.
Begin with the following linear rational expectations model:
yt = A + MEtyt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pvt, (1)
where yt is a vector of n endogenous variables, including, possibly, policy instruments, and vt
comprises all m exogenous variables. Equation (1) is general in that both non-predetermined
variables, Etyt+1,and predetermined variables, yt−1, are represented. By deﬁning auxiliary
variables, e.g., y
j
t = yt+j,j 6=0 , arbitrarily long (ﬁnite) lead or lag lengths can also be
accommodated. Finally, extensions to allow lagged expectations formation; e.g., Et−1yt,
and exogenous variables are straightforward to incorporate with no signiﬁcant changes in
results. Next, deﬁne the prediction error for yt+1,t ob eξt+1 = yt+1 − Etyt+1. Under
rational expectations, Etξt+1 =0 , a martingale diﬀerence sequence. Evans and Honkapohja
[17] show that for at least one rational expectations equilibrium to exist, the stochastic
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Yt+1 = F + BYt + Cvt + Dξt+1, (3)
where Y =[ yt,y t−1]0. Then we can easily show when (3) satisﬁes the Blanchard-Kahn
[3] conditions for stability, namely, that the number of characteristic roots of the matrix
B of norm less than unity equal the number of predetermined variables (taking yt to be
scalar, this is one), then the model is determinate, and there is just one martingale diﬀerence
sequence,  t+1, that will render (2) stationary; if there are fewer roots inside the unit circle
than there are predetermined variables, the model is explosive meaning that there is no
4martingale diﬀerence sequence that will satisfy the system; and if there are more roots inside
the unit circle than there are predetermined variables, the model is said to be indeterminate,
and there are inﬁnite numbers of martingale diﬀerence sequences that make (2) saddle-
point stable.T h e r o o t s o f B are determined by the solution to the characteristic equation:
λ
2 − M−1λ + M−1N =0 .
Determinacy is one thing, learnability is quite another. As Bullard and Mitra [8] have
emphasized, determinacy does not imply learnability, and indeterminacy does not imply
a lack of learnability. We can address this question by postulating a representation for
the REE that a learning agent might use. For the moment, we consider the minimum
state variable (MSV) representation, advanced by McCallum [34]. Let us assume that vt is
observable and follows a ﬁrst-order stochastic process,
vt = ρvt−1 +  t,
where  t is an iid white noise process. The ρ matrix is assumed to be diagonal.
Under these assumptions, we can write the following perceived law of motion (PLM):
yt = a + byt−1 + cvt. (4)
Rewrite equation (1) slightly, and designate expectations formed using adaptive learning
with a superscripted asterisk on the expectations operator, E∗
t:
yt = A + ME
∗
tyt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pv t. (5)
Then, leading (4) one period, taking expectations, substituting (4) into the result, and ﬁnally
into (5), we obtain the actual law of motion, (ALM), the model under the inﬂuence of the
PLM :
yt = A + M(I + b)a +( N + Mb
2)yt−1 +( M(bc + cρ)+P) t. (6)
So the MSV solution will satisfy the mapping from PLM to ALM:
A + M(I + b)a = a,
N + Mb
2 = b,
M(bc + cρ)+P = c.
5Learnability depends then on the mapping of the PLM on to the ALM, deﬁned from (6):
T(a,b,c)=[ A + M(I + b)a,N + Mb
2,M(bc + cρ)+P] (7)
The ﬁxed point of this mapping is a MSV representation of a REE, and its convergence is
given by the matrix diﬀerential equation:
d
dτ
(a,b,c)=T(a,b,c) − (a,b,c). (8)








2 + N − b,
dc
dτ
= M(bc + cρ)+P − c.
As shown by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-
stability are that the eigenvalues of the following matrices have negative real parts:
DTa − I = M(I + b) − I,
DTb − I = b
0 ⊗ M + I ⊗ Mb− I,
DTc − I = ρ
0 ⊗ M + I ⊗ Mb− I.
The important points to take from equations (9) are that the conditions are generally
multivariate in nature–meaning that the coeﬃcients constraining the intercept term, a,c a n
be conﬂated with those of the slope term, b,a n dt h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients of both the PLM and the
ALM come into play. Learnability applications in the literature to date have been conﬁned
to very simple, small-scale models where these problems rarely come into play.7 In the kind
of medium- to large-scale models that policy institutions use, these issues cannot be safely
ignored.8 Without taking away anything from the important contributions of Bullard and
7 A notable exception is Garratt and Hall [22], but even then the learning problem was constrained to
exchange rate determination. The rest of the London Business School model that they used was taken as
known.
8 At the Federal Reserve Board, for example, the staﬀ use a wide range of models to analyze monetary
policy issues, including a variety of reduced-form forecasting models, a calibrated multi-country DSGE
model called SIGMA, a medium-scale DSGE U.S. model, and the FRB/US model, a larger-scale, partly
micro-founded estimated model.
6Mitra [8] and Evans and Honkapohja [19], the choice of monetary policy rules must not only
consider how they foster learnability in a given model but whether they do so for the broader
c l a s so fm o d e l sw i t h i nw h i c ht h et r u el e a r n i n gm o d e lm i g h tb ef o u n d . S i m i l a r l y ,t a k i n ga s
given the true model, the initial beliefs of private agents can aﬀect learnability both through
the inclusion and exclusion of states to the PLM and through the initial values attached to
parameters. In the context of the above example, values of a, b,a n dc that are initially "too
far" from equilibrium can block convergence. The choice of a particular policy can shrink
or expand the range of values for a, b,a n dc that is consistent with E-stability.9 This is
our concern in this paper: how can a policy maker deal with uncertainty in agents’ learning
mechanisms in the choice of his or her policy rule and thereby maximize the prospect that
the economy will converge successfully on a rational expectations equilibrium? For this, we
work with perturbations to the T-mapping described by equations (8) or systems like it. We
take this up in the next subsection.
2.2 Structured robust control
In the preceding subsection, we outlined the theory of least-squares learning in a relatively
general setting. In this subsection we review some useful methods from robust control
theory. Recall that our objective is to uncover the conditions under which monetary policy
can maximize the prospect that the process of learning will converge on a REE–that is, to
robustify learnability–so the integration of the theories of these two subsections is what will
p r o v i d eu sw i t ht h et o o l sw es e e k .
T h ea r g u m e n tt h a tp r i v a t ea g e n t sm i g h th a v e to learn the true structure of the economy
takes a useful step back from the assumption of known and certain linear rational expecta-
tions models. However, what the literature to date has usually taken as given is, ﬁrst, that
agents use least-squares learning to adapt their perceptions of the true economic structure,
and second, that they know the correct linear or linearized form of the REE solution.10 Both
of these assumptions can be questioned. It is a common-place convenience of macroecono-
9 In fact, in this example, the intercept coeﬃcient, a, turns out to be irrelevant for the determination of
learnability, although this result is not general.
10 Evans and Honkapohja [17] survey variations on least-squares learning, including under- and over-
parameterized learning models and discounted (or constant-gain) least squares learning. Still, in general,
either least-squares learning or constant gain learning is assumed. An exception is Marcet and Nicolini [32].
7mists to formulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and then linearize that
model. It is certainly possible that ill-informed agents use only linear approximations of
their true decision rules. But it is hard to argue that the linearized decision rule is any more
valid than some other approximation. Similarly, least-squares learning is the subject of re-
search more because of its analytical tractability than its empirical plausibility. The utility
of tractable, linear formulations of economic forms is undeniable; at the same time, however,
the risk in over reliance on such forms should be just as apparent. There would appear to
be a least a prima facie case for retaining the simplicity of linear state-space representations
and linear rules, while taking seriously the consequences of such approximations.
With this in mind, we retain the assumption of a linear reference model, and least-
squares learning on the part of agents, but assume that the process of learning is subject
to uncertainty. Such uncertainty may arise because agents take their decision rules as
simpliﬁcations of truly optimal decision rules due to the complexity of such rules. Attributing
model uncertainty to agents can also be justiﬁed if we assume that least-squares learning is
untenable in worlds where agents pick and choose the information to which they respond
in forming and updating beliefs. The point is that from the perspective of the monetary
authority, there are good reasons to be wary of both the assumed learning rules and the
underlying models, and yet there is very little guidance on how to model those doubts. We
motivate the present approach by positing a central bank that is concerned about ensuring
learnability of the true model when learning is to subject errors, the distributions of which
are unknown. Accordingly, we analyze these doubts using only a minimum amount of
structure, drawing on the literature on structured model uncertainty and robust control.
For the most part, treatments of robust control have regarded model uncertainty as
unstructured, that is, as uncertainty not ascribed to particular features of the model but
instead represented by one or more additional shock variables wielded by some "evil agent"
bent on causing harm.11 The approach taken here diﬀers in that we consider a central
bank worried about how large agents’ learning errors can be before learning fails to drive the
economy towards eventual equilibrium. The central bank will employ techniques of robust
11 See, in particular, Sargent [41], Giannoni [24], Hansen and Sargent ([26], [27]), Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen ([45], [46]), Onatski and Stock [36], and Onatski and Williams [37].
8control to set the parameters of her policy rule in a way that makes room for the largest
degree of estimation errors by agents without rendering the true model unlearnable. To
develop strategies for setting policies that determine maximum allowable misspeciﬁcations
in agents’ learning models while keeping the economy just shy of becoming unlearnable, we
need to consider structured model uncertainty. Structured model uncertainty shares with
its unstructured sibling a concern for uncertainty in the sense of Knight–meaning that the
uncertainty is assumed to be nonparametric. But structured robust control diﬀers in that
it associates the uncertainty with perturbations to particular parts of the model. More
importantly, to such perturbations we can assign a variety of structures, including time-
series speciﬁcations. Work in this ﬁeld was initiated by Doyle [15] and further developed
in Dahleh and Diaz-Bobillo [52] and Zhou et al. [51], among others. Recent applications
of this strand of robust control to monetary policy can be found in Onatski and Stock [36],
Onatski [35], and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen [45].
While most contributions to the literature on monetary policy have been concerned with
maximizing economic performance, our concern is maximizing the prospects for learnability.
Thus our metric of success is not the usual one of maximized utility or a quadratic approxi-
mation thereof, although we will have a look at the "insurance premium" for robustness.
Boiled down to its essence, the ﬁve steps to designing policies subject to the constraint
that agents must adapt to those policies and a learning model that may be misspeciﬁed are:
1. Write down a structural model of the economy and compute the conditions necessary
for the model to attain a unique saddle-point stationary equilibrium.
2. Given the structural model, formulate the central bank’s depiction of the perceived
law of motion used by agents to learn the structural model. Substitute this into the
structural model to arrive at the actual law of motion. We refer to this as the reference
model. While the reference model is the central bank’s best guess of the ALM, the
bank understands that the reference model is only an approximation of the true ALM,
and doubts remain about its local accuracy.12
12 It is sometimes argued that robust control–by which people mean minmax approaches to model
uncertainty–is unreasonable on the face of things. The argument is that the worst-case assumption is
too extreme, that to quote a common phrase, "if I worried about the worst case outcome every day, I
93. Specify a set of perturbations to the reference model structured in such a way as to
isolate the possible misspeciﬁcations to which the reference model is regarded to be
most vulnerable.
4. For a given policy, use structured singular value analysis to determine the maximum
allowable perturbations to the ALM that will bring the economy up to, but not beyond,
the point of E-instability.
5. Finally, compute the policy for which the allowable range of misspeciﬁcations is the
largest.
When, in the agents’ learning model–the MSV-based PLM described in (4)–the pa-
rameters a, b,a n dc or Π, have been correctly estimated by agents, this model should be
considered to be the true reduced form of the structural model in (1). Note, however, that
even if individuals manage to specify their learning model correctly in terms of included vari-
ables and lag structures, the expectations of future output and inﬂation they base on these
estimates are (at best) in a period of transition towards being truly rational. The model
that agents actually estimate may diﬀer from (1) in various ways that may be persistent.
We want to determine how far oﬀ the true model agents’ learning model can become before
it becomes in principle unlearnable.
To begin, we rewrite the ALM from (6) and vectorize the disturbance,  t,t oe m p h a s i z e
the stochastic nature of the estimating problem faced by agents,
Yt+1 = ΠYt +e  t,








Notice that by using the ALM, we are modeling the problem from the policy authority’s
point of view. The authority is taken as knowing, up to the perturbations we are about to
wouldn’t get out of bed in the morning". Such remarks miss the point that the worst-case outcome should
be thought of as local in nature. Decision makers are envisioned as wanting to protect against uncertainties
that are empirically indistinguishable from the data generating process underlying their reference models.
10add to the model, the structure of private agents’ learning problems. As a consequence, the
authority is in a position to inﬂuence the resolution of that problem.
Potential errors in parameter estimation are then represented by a perturbation block, ∆.
In principle, the ∆ operator can be structured to implement a variety of misspeciﬁcations,
including alternative dynamic features. Robust control theory is remarkably rich in how it
allows one to consider omitted lag dynamics, inappropriate exogeneity restrictions, missing
nonlinearities, and time variation. This being the ﬁrst paper of its kind, we keep our goals
modest: in the language of linearo p e r a t o rt h e o r y ,w ew i l lc o n ﬁne our analysis to linear
time-invariant scalar (LTI-scalar) perturbations. LTI-scalar perturbations represent such
events as one-time shifts and structural breaks in model parameters, as agents perceive them.
Such perturbations have been the subject of study of parametric model uncertainty; see, e.g.,
Bullard and Euseppi [7].13 With this restriction, the perturbed model becomes:14
e  t = Yt+1 − [Π + W1∆W2]Yt,
=[ Q − W1∆W2]Yt, (10)
where Q = InL−1 − Π, L is the lag operator, ∆ is a k × k linear, time-invariant block-
diagonal operator representing potentially destabilizing learning errors, and W1 and W2 are,
respectively, (n+1)×k and k×(n+1)selector matrices of zeros and ones that select which
parameters in which equations are deemed to be subject to such errors. Either W1 or W2
can, in addition, be chosen to attach scalar weights to the individual perturbations so as to
reﬂect relative uncertainties with which model estimates are to be regarded. The second line
is convenient for analyzing stability of the perturbed model under potentially destabilizing
learning errors. Using this construction, the perturbation operator, ∆, and the weighting
matrices can be structured so that misspeciﬁcations are focused on particular features of the
model deemed especially susceptible to learning errors involving the model’s variables for
any chosen lag or lags.
The essence of this paper is to ﬁnd out how large, in a sense to be deﬁned presently,
the misspeciﬁcations represented by the perturbations in (10)–called the radius of allowable
13 See Evans and Honkapohja [17] for some treatment of learning with an over-parameterized PLM.
14 Multiplicative errors in speciﬁcation would be modeled in a manner analagous to (10):  t =[ A(1 −
W1∆W2)]Yt.
11perturbations–can become without eliciting a failure of convergence to rational expectations
equilibrium. Any policy that expands the set of aﬀordable perturbations is one that allows
the widest room for misspeciﬁcations committed by agents and thus oﬀers an improved
chance that policy will not be destabilizing. To do this we bring the tools of structured
robust control analysis mentioned earlier.
Let D denote the class of allowable perturbations to the set of parameters of a model
deﬁned as those that carry with them the structure information of the perturbations. Let
r>0 be some ﬁnite scalar and deﬁne Dr as the set of perturbations in (10) that obey
||∆|| <r ,w h e r e||∆|| is the induced norm of ∆ considered as an operator acting in a normed
space of random processes15. The scalar, r, can be considered a single measure of the
maximum size of errors in estimation. A policy authority wishing to operate with as much
room to maneuver as possible will act to maximize this range. For the tools to be employed
here, norms will be deﬁned in complex space. In what follows, much use is made of the
concept of maximum singular value, conventionally denoted by σ16. For reasons that will
become clearer below, the norm of ∆ that we shall use will be the L∞ norm of the function








where max·eig denotes the maximum eigenvalue. The choice of ||∆||∞ as a measure of
the size of perturbations conveys a sense that the authority is concerned with worst-case
outcomes.
Imagine two artiﬁcial vectors, ht =[ h1t,h 2t,...,hkt]0 and pt =[ p1t,p 2t,...,pkt]0, connected
15 Induced norms are deﬁned as follows. Let X be a vector space. A real-valued function | |·| |deﬁned on
X is said to be a norm on X if it satisﬁes: (i) ||x|| ≥ 0,( i i )||x|| =0only if x =0 , (iii) ||αx|| =| α || | x|| for
any scalar α,( i v )||x + y|| ≤ ||x|| + ||y|| for any x ∈ X and y ∈ X.F o rx ∈ Cn,t h eLp vector p-norm on x
is deﬁned as ||x||p =(
Pn
i=1 |xi|p)1/p,w h e r e1 ≤ p ≤∞ .F o rp =2 , L2 = ||x||2 =
pPn
i=1 |xi|2,t h a ti s ,t h e
quadratic problem. Corresponding to L2,we also have L1 =
Pn
i=1 |xi|,a n dL∞ =m a x 1≤i≤1 |xi|. Finally, let
A =[ aij] ∈ Cm×n in an equation yt = Atxt,w h e r ext may some random vector. The matrix norm induced
by a vector p-norm, ||x||p,i s||A||p ≡ supx6=0
||Ax||p
||x||p . Note that for p =2 , ||A||2 =
p
maxeig(A · A)and
||A||1 =m a x 1≤j≤n
Pn
i=1 |aij|. More details are given in Tetlow and von zur Muehlen [45].
16 As is apparent from the expression in (11), the largest singular value, σ(X),o fam a t r i x ,X,i st h e
largest eigenvalue of X0X.
12to each other and to Yt via17
pt = W2Yt
ht = ∆ · pt.














ht = ∆ · pt. (13)











where G1 =( InL−1 − Π)−1W1,a n dG2 = W2(InL−1 − Π)−1W1 is a n × k matrix, where k is
the number of diagonal elements in ∆. As we shall see, the stability of the interconnection
between ht and pt, representing a feedforward pt = G2ht and a feedback ht = ∆·pt,i sc r i t i c a l .
Note ﬁrst that, together, these two relationships imply the homogenous matrix equation
0=( Ik − G2∆)pt. (15)
An E-stable ALM is also dynamically stable, meaning that Π has all its eigenvalues inside
the unit circle. To make this link, the following theorem is critical.
Theorem 1 The Small Gain Theorem.
Let Re(s) denote the real part of s ∈ C,w h e r eC is the ﬁeld of complex numbers, and
let H∞ denote the set of L∞ functions analytic in Re(s) > 0. Furthermore, let RH∞
designate the set of real, rational values in the H∞-normed space. Suppose G2 ∈ RH∞ and
r>0. Then the interconnected system in (12)-(13) is well posed and internally stable for
all ∆(s) ∈ RH∞ with
(a) ||∆|| ≤ 1/r, if and only if ||G2(s)||∞ <r ,
(b) ||∆|| < 1/r, if and only if ||G2(s)||∞ ≤ r.
17 See Dahleh and Bobillo [14], chapter 10.
18 Because the random errors in this model play no role in what follows, we leave out the   vector.
13Proof: See Zhou and Doyle,[52] p. 137. ¤
By assumption, Q,d e ﬁned in (10), is invertible on the unit circle, allowing us to write19
det(Q)det(Ik − G2∆)=det(Q)det(Ik − W2Q
−1W1∆)
= det(Q)det(Ik − Q
−1W1∆W2)
= det(Q − W1∆W2).
The preceding expressions establish the link between stability of the interconnection, G2,
and stability of the perturbed model: if det(Ik − G2∆)=0 , then the perturbed model (10)
is no longer invertible on the unit circle, hence unstable, and vice versa. Thus, any policy
rule that stabilizes the G2 also stabilizes the augmented system (12)-(13). The question
to be asked then is how large, in the sense ||.||∞,c a n∆ become without destabilizing the
feedback system (12)-(13).
The settings we consider involve linear time-invariant perturbations, where the object is
to ﬁnd the minimum of the largest singular value of the matrix, ∆,f r o mt h ec l a s so fDr such
that I − G2∆ is not invertible. The inverse of this minimum, expressed in the frequency





min{¯ σ[∆(eiω)] : ∆ ∈ Dr,det(I − G2∆)(eiω)=0 }
, (16)
with the provision that if there is no ∆ such that det(I−G2∆)(eiω)=0 ,t h e nµ[G2(eiω)] = 0.
The small gain theorem then tells us that, for some r>0, the loop (12)-(13) is well posed
and internally stable for all ∆(.) ∈ Dr with ||∆|| <r , if and only if supω∈R µ[G2(eiω)] ≤ 1/r.
Let φ denote a vector of policy parameters.
Thus we can now formally state the problem that interests us as seeking a best φ = φ
∗








19 The small gain theorem links the stability of the loop between p and h under perturbations to the
full system subject to model uncertainty. For some suﬃciently large number r, such that ||∆||∞ <r ,
the determinant det(Ik − G2∆) 6=0 .N o w r a i s e r to some value r such that det(Ik − G2∆)=det(Ik −
W2Q−1W1∆)=0 .
20 The singular value is said to be "structured" in recognition of structure built into the perturbation
matrix, ∆. Through selection of the structure, ∆ can encompass uncertainties about one-time shifts in
selected parameters, unmodeled dynamics in parts of the model, and nonlinearities, among other things.
14subject to the satisfaction of the saddle-point stability condition for the relevant model.
The solution to this problem is not amenable to analytical methods, except in special
cases, an example of which we explore in the next section. Instead, we will employ eﬃcient
numerical techniques to ﬁnd the lower bound on the structured singular value. The minimum
of µ−1(G2) over ω ∈ [0,π] is exactly the maximal allowable range of misspeciﬁcation for a
given policy. A monetary authority wishing to give agents the widest latitude for learning
errors that nevertheless allow the system to converge on REE selects those parameters in its
policy rule that yield largest value of r.
Figure 1 below provides a schematic representation of what is done. Given a policy rule,
the ALM (and hence the reference model) is represented by the transition matrix, Π. By
assumption it is in the stable and determinate region of the space. The central bank chooses
perturbation, ∆,t oΠ. The largest feasible perturbation, Π∗
∆—the one that renders the
largest radius, r,d e ﬁnes a region shown by the ellipse within which any ALM, including
but not restricted to the reference model ALM, will converge on a rational expectations
equilibrium. The weights, W1 and W2, determine the shape of the ellipse. Perturbations
larger (in norm) than r will push the ellipse over the line into indeterminate or explosive
regions; smaller perturbations provide less robustness than the optimal one.
3 Two examples
We study two sample economies, one the very simple model of money demand in hyperinﬂa-
tions of Cagan [10], the other the linearized neo-Keynesian model originated by Woodford
([48], [49]), Rotemberg and Woodford [39] and Goodfriend and King [25]. Closed-form solu-
tions for µ, being non-linear functions of the eigenvalues of models, are not generally feasible.
However, some insight is possible through considering simple scalar example economies like
the Cagan model. The second has the virtue of having been studied extensively in the lit-
erature on monetary policy design. It thus provides some solid benchmarks for comparison.
15Figure 1: Schematic representation of robust learnability
3.1 A simple univariate example
Consider a version of Cagan’s monetary model, cited in Evans and Honkapohja [17], although
our rendition diﬀers slightly. The model has two equations, one determining (the log of)
the price level, pt, and the other a simple monetary feedback rule determining the (log of
the) money supply,m t:
mt − pt = −κ(Etpt+1 − pt)
mt = χ − φpt−1.
Normally, all parameters should be greater than zero; for κ this means that money demand is
inversely related to expected inﬂation. We will relax this assumption a bit later. Combining
the two equations leads to:
pt = α + βEtpt+1 − γpt−1, (17)
where α = χ/(1+κ) , β = κ/(1+κ), and γ = φ/(1+κ). To set the stage for what follows,
let us consider the conditions for a unique rational expectations equilibrium. First oﬀ,w e
will clearly want to assume that β,γ 6=0to avoid degenerate models. We will go a bit
further and assume that β − γ 6=1 , which is a mild invertibility assumption. We will also
16assume that κ 6=0and κ 6= −1. Finally, for simplicity we will focus on the case where
solutions are real. Standard methods then reveal:
βλ
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where λi,i=1 ,2 are the eigenvalues of the quadratic equations associated with (17). As
is well known from Blanchard and Kahn [3], among other sources, Equation (18) is the
key to establishing existence and uniqueness of saddle-point equilibruim. Letting λ1 ≥ λ2,
without loss of generality, if 1 <λ 2 ≤ λ1,then the model is explosive, meaning that there
are no initial conditions which can establish a saddle-point equilibrium; if λ2 ≤ λ1 < 1,
then the model is said to be irregular, meaning that every set of initial conditions leads to
ad i ﬀerent equilibrium. Putting the same thing in diﬀerent words, the equilibrium is said
to be indeterminate (or non-unique). Finally, the condition λ2 < 1 <λ 1 is the condition
for saddle-point stability; that is, the condition by which all (local) sets of initial conditions
converge, in expectation, on the same equilibrium. In this instance, the equilibrium is said
to be determinate (or regular, or unique). Inspection of the equation to the right of the
ﬁr s te q u a l i t yi ne q u a t i o n( 1 8 )s h o w st h a tt h ed e t e r m i n a c yo ft h em o d e li sg o v e r n e db yt h e
interaction between the structural money-demand parameter, κ, and the policy feedback
parameter, φ.
Proposition 1 Assume that κ 6= −1.F o r κ>−1, determinacy requires: φ>−1 and
φ<1+2 κ.F o r κ<−1, determinacy requires φ<−1 and φ>1+2 κ.
Proof: Equation (18) means that | β − γ |=| (κ − φ)/(1 + κ) |< 1 is the condition for
exactly one eigenvalue to be above unity. There are two cases. Assume ﬁrst that κ>−1,






¯ ¯ < 1
ª






¯ ¯ < 1
ª
= {φ<−1} ∪ {φ>1+2 κ} . ¤
Now let us assume that agents form expectations employing adaptive learning, and desig-
nate expectations formation in this way with the operator, E∗
t.T h e p e r c e i v e d l a w o f m o t i o n
for this model is assumed to be pt = a + bpt−1—the minimum state variable (MSV) solution,
17implying E∗
tpt+1 =( 1+b)a+b2pt−1. The actual law of motion is found by substituting the
PLM into the structural model:
pt =[ α + βa(1 + b)] + (βb
2 − γ)pt−1. (19)





b ).T h i s i s
Ta: a = α + βa(1 + b) (20)
Tb: b = βb
2 − γ. (21)
It is equation (21) that is key for the learnability of the model. But notice that (21) is
identical to equation (18) with b = λi. This means that the conditions for learnability and
determinacy are tightly connected in this particular model, as we shall discuss in detail
below. The solutions to equations (20) and (21) are:
a = α/[1 − β(1 + b)] (22)
b = .5[1 ±
p
1+4 βγ]/β. (23)
Equation (23) is quadratic with one root greater than or equal to unity, and the other
less than unity. Designate the larger of the two values for b as b+ and the smaller as b−.
Existence of the REE requires us to choose the smaller root; otherwise,b+ 1 b− > 1.T h e







b ) − (
a
b ),








The eigenvalues of DT − I are,
ψ1 =2 βb− 1 (24)
ψ2 = β(1 + b) − 1. (25)
Satisfaction of the weak E-stability condition requires that both eigenvalues be negative.
18Proposition 2 Determinate solutions of the Cagan model that are real are also E-stable.
Proof: Substitute the expression for b− into (24) to get ψ1 = −[1 + 4κφ/(1 + κ)2]1/2and do
the same for (25) to arrive at ψ2 = κ/(1 + κ) − 1
2 + ψ1. Substitute ψ1into b− to arrive
at: b− = 1+κ
2κ [1 + ψ1]. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for ψ1 < 0, ψ1 ∈ < is (P1):
φ>(1+κ)2/(4κ) ≡ S. Proposition 1 imposes restrictions on φ as a function of κ to ensure
determinacy. For κ>−1,t h e s ea r eφ>−1 and φ<1+2 κ. Substituting these into the
expression for ψ1 gives ψ1 < −[(1 + 3κ)/(1 + κ)]2 which readily yields ψ1 < 0 and is real
whenever | b− |< 1 provided the solution is real. Simple substitution of ψ1into ψ2 shows that
ψ2 is also negative. For κ<−1, a similar proof applies. ¤
Having outlined the connection between b and β (or κ) for E-stability, let us now consider
unstructured perturbations to the ALM. Let Xt =[ 1 pt]0. The reference ALM model is




α + βa(1 + b) βb2 − γ
¸
is the model’s transition matrix. For simplicity, let us focus on b as the object of concern to
policy makers, and let the policy maker apply structured perturbations to Π, scaled by the
parameter, σb. The scaling parameter can be thought of as a standard deviation, but need








α + βa(1 + b) βb2 − γ + ∆
¸
.
As in (14), the relevant matrices are deﬁned in complex space. Accordingly, let z =




−α − βa(1 + b) z−1 − βb2 + γ
¸
= I · z
−1 − Π,

























1 − (βb2 − γ)z
.
19It is for this expression that we seek the smallest structured singular value, µ,a si n d i c a t e d
by (16).
In the multivariate case, the scaling parameter σb, can be parameterized as the standard
deviation of b relative to a, although other methods of parameterization can be entertained.
Doing so would reﬂect a concern for robustness of the decision maker and thus could also be
thought of as a taste parameter. Since it is a relative term, it will turn out to be irrelevant in
this scalar case, and so from here we set it to unity without loss of generality. The structured
norm of G2–equal to the absolute value of this last expression (see footnote 15)–is µ.I t
is also easily established that the maximum of µ over the frequency range {−π,π}, let us
call it µ is µ = ||∆||∞ = |G2| arises at frequency π. Also, since at frequency π, z = −1,i t
follows that |G2| = µ = 1












1+4 βφ/(1 + κ)],
which depends inversely on the policy parameter, φ.21 Note also that while we have derived
this expression for ∆ by applying perturbations to the ALM, we would have obtained exactly
the same result by working with the PLM.
If equation ∆ is the allowable perturbation, conditional on a given φ,t h e nw ec a nd e ﬁne
a φ
∗ as the policy maker’s optimal choice of φ, where optimality is deﬁn e di nt h es e n s eo f
choosing the largest possible perturbation to b –call it ∆∗–such that the model will retain
the property of E-stability. Let us call this the maximum allowable perturbation.I t i s t h e
∆∗ and the associated φ
∗ that is at a boundary where ∆ is just above −1:
φ
∗ =1+2 κ −  , (27)
where φ<1+2 κ maintains stable convergence toward a REE and   is an arbitrarily small
positive constant necessary to keep b + ∆ oﬀ the unit circle. Note that this expression
for φ
∗ indicates that the monetary authority will always respond more than one-for-one to
21 Note that at frequency π, 1 − G2∆ =1− σb
(1+b)
(1+b)
σb =0as required by the deﬁnition of µ.
20deviations in lagged prices from steady state, with the extent of that over-response being a
positive function of the slope of the money demand function. Substituting these expressions
















α − βa(1 + b) −1+η
¸
, (28)
where η is an arbitrarily small number, as determined by   in (27). The preceding conﬁrms
that the authority’s policy is resilient to a perturbation in the learning model that pushes the
transition matrix is to the borderline of instability. In other words, setting a φ that allows
for the maximal stable misspeciﬁcation of the learning model is one that permits convergence
to the REE.
Figure 2 shows the regions of dynamic stability and learnability for the Cagan model as
functions of the structural parameters: the absolute interest elasticity of money demand,
κ, and the monetary policy feedback parameter, φ. As noted in the legend to the right,
the determinate regions of the structural model are the blue areas, to the northeast and
southwest of the ﬁgure. Proposition 1 above, warns the monetary authority to stay out of
the indeterminate regions, the sliver of purple toward the southeast of the chart, that is
possible for some κ>0 when φ<−1, and the larger region of purple to the west. Also to
be avoided are the orange regions of explosive solutions to the north and south.
T h eE - s t a b l er e g i o ni st h el a r g ea r e ab e t w e e nt h et w od a s h e dl i n e s . T h eﬁrst thing to
note is that E-stability does not imply determinacy: convergence in learning on indeterminate
equilibria in the area where both −1 <κ<−1/2 and −1 <φ<0, is possible, corroborating
a point made by Evans and McGough [20] in a diﬀerent context. In addition, learnability of
unstable equilibria is also possible as shown by the orange regions between the two dashed
lines. Indeed, even if one were to accept ap r i o r ithat κ>0, as Cagan assumed, there
are unstable equilibria that are learnable. At the same time, the ﬁgure clearly shows what
Proposition 2 noted: for this model, determinate models are always E-stable; the blue region
is entirely within the area bordered by the two dashed lines. It follows that in the special
21Figure 2: Regions of determinacy and E-stability in the Cagan model
case of the Cagan model, robustifying learnability is equivalent to maximizing the basin of
attraction for the rational expectations equilibrium of the model. The loci of robust policies,
φ
∗, conditional of values of κ, is shown by the thick diagonal line running from the south
west to north east of the chart, and marked φ
∗ =1+2 κ. The line shows that contrary to
what unguided intuition might suggest, the robust policy does not choose a rule that is in
the middle of the blue determinate and E-stable region, but rather chooses a policy that
might be quite close to the boundary of indeterminacy for the REE. Doing so increases the
region of E-stable ALMs—something that cannot be seen in the chart—and thereby enhances
the prospects for convergence on an REE.
3.2 The canonical New Keynesian model
We now turn to an analysis of the canonical New Keynesian business cycle model of Rotem-
berg and Woodford [39], Goodfriend and King [39] and others. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler [12]
used this model to derive optimal discretionary as well as optimal commitment rules. Their
22version includes a speciﬁed process for exogenous natural output. Evans and Honkapohja
[18] study this model to explore issues of determinacy and learnability for several optimal
commitment rules. Bullard and Mitra [9] likewise use the Woodford model to examine
determinacy and learnability of variants of the Taylor rule.
The behavior of the private sector is described by two equations. The aggregate demand
(IS) equation is a log-linearized Euler equation derived from optimal consumer behavior,
xt = E
∗





and the aggregate supply (AS) equation–indeed, the price setting rule for monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms is,
πt = κxt + βE
∗
tπt+1, (30)
where x is the log deviation of output from potential output, π is inﬂation, r is a short-
term interest rate controlled by the central bank, and rn is the natural interest rate. For
the application of Bullard and Mitra’s [8] (BM) example, we assume that rn






t−1 +  r,t, (31)
0 ≤ |ρr| < 1,a n d r,t ∼ iid(0,σ2
r). This is essentially Woodford’s [48] version of this model,
which speciﬁes that aggregate demand responds to the deviation of the real rate, rt−Etπt+1
from the natural rate, rn
t .
We need to close the model with an interest-rate feedback rule. We study three types of
policy rules. In the ﬁrst set of experiments described in Section 3.3, a central bank chooses
an interest rate setting in each period as a reaction to observed events, such as inﬂation and
the output gap, without explicitly attempting to improve some measure of welfare. Instead,
the policy authority is mindful of the eﬀect its policy has on the prospect of the economy
reaching REE and designs its rule accordingly. Bullard and Mitra [8] study such rules for
their properties in promoting learnable equilibria and consider that eﬀort as prior to one of
ﬁnding optimal policy rules consistent with REE. We take this analysis further by seeking
to ﬁnd policy rules that maximize learnability of agents’ models when policy inﬂuences the
outcome.
23The information protocol in these experiments is as follows. The central bank knows
the structural model and has access to the data. Economic agents see the data, which
change over time, and formulate the perceived law of motion. Agents form expectations
based on recursive (least-squares) estimation of a reduced form. The data are regenerated
each period, subject to the authority having implemented its policy and agents’ having made
investment and consumption decisions based on their newly formed expectations.
We assume that agents mistakenly specify a vector-autoregressive model in the endoge-
nous and exogenous variables of the model. That means we assume the learning model to
be overparameterized in comparison with the model implied by the MSV solution. The
scaling factors used in W1 to scale the perturbations to the PLM are the standard errors of
the coeﬃcients obtained from an initial run of a recursive least squares regression of such
a VAR with data being updated by the true model, given an arbitrary but determinate
parameterization of the policy rule being studied. As noted earlier, an alternative approach
would be to revise the scalings with each trial policy, given that the VAR would likely change
with each parameterization of policy. We leave this for a revision.
3.3 Simple interest-rate feedback rules
This section describes two versions of the Taylor rule analyzed by Bullard and Mitra [8].
The complete system comprises equations (29)-(32), and the exogenous variable, rn
t .T h e
policy instrument is the nominal interest rate, rt.T h e ﬁr s tp o l i c yr u l es p e c i ﬁes that the
interest rate responds to lagged inﬂation and the lagged output gap. In their paper, BM
study the role of interest-rate inertia and so include a lagged interest rate term.
rt = φππt−1 + φxxt−1 + φrrt−1 (32)
McCallum has advocated such a lagged data rule because of its implementability, given that
contemporaneous data are generally not available in real time to policy makers.
Some research suggests that forward-looking rules perform well in theory (see, e.g., Evans
and Honkapohja [18]) as well as in actual economies, such as Germany, Japan, and the US





txt+1 + φrrt−1. (33)
24The expectations operator E∗ has an asterisk to indicate that expectations need not be
rational.
Finally, the most popular rules of this class are contemporaneous data rules, of which
the following is our choice:
rt = φππt + φxxt + φrrt−1 (34)
where as before, we allow the lagged federal funds rate to appear to capture instrument-
smoothing behavior by uncertainty averse decision makers.
3.4 Results
We adopt BM’s calibration for the New Keynesian model’s parameters, σ =1 /.157, κ = .024,
β = .99,a n dρ = .35, the same calibration as in Woodford [49]. We also set σr =0 .01.F o r
reference purposes, it is useful to compare our results against those of rules that are not












t+j + λr(rt+j − r
∗)
2]. (35)
Walsh [47] shows that with the values λx = .077 and λi = .027, equation (35) is the quadratic
approximation to the social welfare function of the model. Rules that are computed to
maximize the prospect of convergence to REE under the greatest possible misspeciﬁcation
of the ALM model in the manner described above will be referred to as "robust" or "robust
learnable" rules. A credible benchmark against which to compare these robust rules, are
what we shall refer to as optimized rules. These are rules that minimize (35) subject to (29),
(30), (31) and one of either (32), (34) or (33). Such rules can be optimized using a standard
hill-climbing algorithm using methods well described in the appendix to Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen [44] among other sources.
Let us consider the lagged-data rule ﬁrst. BM ﬁnd that the determinacy of a unique ra-
tional expectations equilibrium, as well as convergence toward that equilibrium when agents
learn adaptively, is extremely sensitive to the policy parameters, φr, φx,a n dφπ. Without
some degree of monetary policy inertia, (φr > 0), this model is determinate and learnable,
25with the above calibrations, only if the Taylor principle holds, (φπ > 1), and t h er e s p o n s et o
the output gap is modest, (φx ≤ 0.5). Insuﬃcient or excessive responsiveness to either inﬂa-
tion or the output gap can in some instances lead to explosive instability or indeterminacy.
Through simulation, BM establish the regions for the parameters that lead to determinacy
as well as E-stability.
Table 1 shows our results. The table is broken into three panels. The upper panel—the
rows marked (1) to (3)—shows optimized rules. The second panel, contains some results for
the generic Taylor rule. Finally, the third panel shows our robust learnable rules. The
next-to-last column of the table gives a measure of the total uncertainty that the PLM can
tolerate under the cited policy. It is a measure of the maximal allowable deviation embodied
in 1/µ. 22 T h el a s tc o l u m ns h o w st h el o s sa sm e a s u r e db y( 3 5 ) .
Table 1 : Standard and robust learnable rules
row φx φπ φr radius1 L2
optimized rules:
lagged data rule (1) 0.052 0.993 1.13 1.07 3.679
contemporaneous data rule (2) 0.053 0.995 1.12 1.06 3.626
forecast-based rule (3) 0.286 0.999 1.32 0.88 3.628
standard rules:
Taylor rule (4) 0.500 1.500 0 0.85 5.690
robust learnable rules:
lagged data rule (5) 0.065 0.40 1.10 1.16 3.712
contemporaneous data rule (6) 0.052 1.21 1.41 1.13 3.701
forecast-based rule (7) 0.040 2.80 0.10 2.32 4.434
1.Magnitude of the largest allowable perturbation. r =k W1∆W2 k∞
2. Asymptotic loss, calculated according to eq. (35) in REE under the reference model.
Let us concentrate initially on our optimized rules along with the Taylor rule to provide
some context for the robust learnable rules. The lagged data rule, shown in row (1), and
the contemporaneous data rule, (2), are essentially the same. They both feature very
small feedback on the output gap, and strong responses to inﬂation. Moreover, they also
feature funds rate persistence that amounts to a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule; that is, a rule where
the dependent variable is ∆r rather than r. The forecast-based rule, in line (3), has much
stronger feedback on the output gap, although proper interpretation of this requires noting
that in equilibrium the expectation of future output gaps will always be smaller than actual
22 For comparison of the trials with each other and also to give a sense of natural units related to the
scalings we employed, the radius is calculated as the H∞ norm of the scaled perturbations to the PLM
model: radius = ||W1∆W2||∞.
26gaps because of the absence of expected future shocks and the internalization of future policy
in the formulation of that expectation. Thus, the response of the funds rate to the expected
future gap will not be as large as the feedback coeﬃcient alone might lead one to believe.
These three rules conﬁrm the received wisdom of monetary control in New Keynesian
models, to wit: strong feedback on inﬂation, comparatively little on output, and strong
persistence in funds rate setting. These rules are chosen to minimize the loss shown in the
right-hand column of the table; the losses for all three are very similar, at a little over 3.6.
The results for the Taylor rule demonstrate, indirectly, the oft-discussed advantages of
persistence in funds rate setting for monetary control. Without such persistence, the Taylor
rule produces losses that are substantially higher than those of the optimized rules.
Now let us turn to the robust learnable rules in the bottom panel of the table, concentrat-
ing for the moment on the lagged data and contemporaneous data rules shown in lines (5)
and (6). The ﬁrst thing to note is that the results conﬁrm the eﬃcacy of persistence in in-
strument setting. The robust learnable rules are at least as persistent—if persistence greater
than unity is a meaningful concept—as the optimized rules. At the same time, while per-
sistence is evidently useful for learnability, our results do not point to the hyper-persistence
result, (φr À 1), that BM hint at. To understand this outcome, it is important to realize
that while our results are related to the BM results, there are conceptual diﬀerences. BM
describe the range of policy-rule coeﬃcients for which the model is learnable, taking as given
the model. We are describing the range of policy coeﬃcients that maximizes the range of
models that are still learnable. So while large values for φr are beneﬁcial to learnability
holding constant the model and its associated ALM, at some point, they come at a cost in
terms of the perturbations that can be withstood in other dimensions.
Now let us look at the costs and beneﬁts of these two rules in comparison with their
optimized counterparts. We measure the beneﬁts by comparing the radii of robustness
from the column second from the right, for various rules. For the optimized, outcome-
based rules, shown in the ﬁrst two rows of the table, the radii are about 1.06 or so, while
those of their robustiﬁed couterparts range from 1.13 to 1.16. Thus the improvement in
robustness of learnability would appear to be moderate. Costs are inferred by comparing
the losses shown in the right-hand column of the table. The results show that the cost of
27maximizing learnability measured in terms of foregone performance in the REE is very small.
Evidently, learnability can be robustiﬁed, to some degree, without much of any concomitant
loss in economic performance, at least in the canonical NKB model.
Before moving on to forecast-based rules, let us consider the classic Taylor rule shown in
the fourth row. Recall that the Taylor rule has been advocated as a policy that is at least
reasonably robust across a fairly wide range of models. Here, however, the radius associated
w i t ht h eT a y l o rr u l ei ss h o w nt ob eq u i t es m a l la t0 . 8 5 . A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ep e r f o r m a n c e
of the rule in terms of loss is relatively weak. Thus, to the extent that we can take claims of
the robustness of the Taylor rule with its original parameterization as applying to the issue
of learnability, the rule would appear to come up a bit short.
Now let us examine the results for the forecast-based policy shown in the seventh row.
Here the prescribed robust learnable policy is much diﬀerent from the optimized rule shown
in line (3). The robust rule essentially removes the policy persistence that the optimized
policy calls for. The policy performance in the rational expectations equilibrium of the
forecast-based robustly learnable rule is somewhat worse than its optimized counterpart,
but notice that the radius of learnability is nearly triple that of the optimized rule.
While the superiority in terms of robustness of an (almost) non-intertial forecast-based
rule is superﬁcially at odds with Bullard and Mitra, the result really should not be all
that surprising. Forecast-based rules leverage heavily the rational expectations aspects of
the model—even more so than the contemporaneous and lagged data rules since there are
rational expectations in the model itself and in the policy rule—and there is risk in leverage.
The learnability of the economy is highly susceptible to misspeciﬁcation in this area. This
is, of course, just a manifestation of the problem that Bernanke and Woodford [2] and others
have warned about.
We can obtain a deeper understanding of the eﬀects of a concern for robust learnability
on policy design by examining the properties of diﬀerent calibrations of policy rules for their
eﬀects on the allowable perturbations. The magnitude of perturbations that a given model
can tolerate, conditional on a policy rule, is given by the radius. The radii for the rules
shown in Table 1 are in the column second from the right. We can, however, provide a
visualization of radii mapped against policy-rule coeﬃcients and judge how policy aﬀects
28robust learnability.
Figure 3 provides one such visualization: contour maps of radii against the output-gap
feedback coeﬃcient, φx, and inﬂation feedback coeﬃcient, φπ, in this case for the contempo-
raneous data rule. The third dimension of policy, the feedback on the lagged fed funds rate,
φr, is being held constant in these charts, at zero in the upper panel and at unity in the lower.
The colors of the chart index the radii of allowable perturbations for each rule, with the bar
at the right-hand side showing the tolerance for misspeciﬁcation. The area in deep blue, for
example, represents policies with no tolerance for misspeciﬁcation of the model or learning
whatsoever, either because the rule fails to deliver E-stability in the ﬁrst place, or because
it is very fragile. The sizable region of deep blue in the upper panel shows the area that
violates the Taylor principle. The right of the deep blue region–where φπ > 1–we enter
regions of green, where there is modest tolerance for misspeciﬁcation that allows learnability.
In general, with no interest-rate smoothing, there is little scope for misspeciﬁcation.
Now let us look at the case where φr =1in the bottom panel. Now the region of
deep blue is relegated to the very south-west of the chart, as is the region of green. To the
north-east of those are expansive areas of higher tolerance for misspeciﬁcation. Evidently,
at least some measure of persistence in policy is useful for robustifying learnability. Notice
how there is a deep burgundy sliver of fairly strong robustness in the north-east part of the
panel.
Figure 4 continues the analysis for the contemporaneous data rule by showing contour
charts for two more levels of φr. The upper panel shows the value for the rule that allows
the maximum allowable perturbation as shown in line (6) of the table. With φr =1 .41 the
burgundy region of highest robustness is at its largest and the policy rule shown in line (6) of
the table is within that region. More generally, the area of signiﬁcant robustness–the redder
regions–are collectively quite large. Finally, we go to the bottom panel of the ﬁgure which
shows the results for a relatively high level of φr. What has happened is that the regions
s h o w ni nt h et o pp a n e lh a v er o t a t e dd o w na n dt ot h er i g h ta sφr has risen. The burgundy
region is now gone, and the red regions command much less space. Thus, while policy
persistence is good for learnability, in terms of robustness of that result to misspeciﬁcation,
one can go too far.
29Figure 3: Contours of radii for the NKB model, contemporaneous data rule, selected φr
30Figure 4: Contours of radii for the NKB model, contemporaneous data rule, selected φr
31Figures 3 and 4 cover the case of the contemporaneous data rule. We turn now to
forecast-based rules. The results here look quite diﬀerent, but the underlying message is
very much the same. As before, Figure 5 shows the results for low levels of persistence
in policy setting. The upper panel shows the static forecast-based rule. The deep blue
areas to the left of φπ =1are areas of indeterminacy, as they were in Figure 3. There
are, however, numerous blue "potholes" elsewhere in the panel. These are areas where
the learnable equilibrium is feasible, but fragile.23 Notice, however, that these blue regions
border very closely to burgundy regions where the allowable perturbations exceed 2; that
is, the allowable perturbations are very large. The bottom panel shows contours covering
the policy persistence level that is optimal, as shown in line (7) of table 1. There are fewer
potholes. The optimally robust policy is toward the top of this chart.
Finally, let us examine Figure 6. The top panel shows that a small increase in φr from
0.10 to 0.12, reduces the number of potholes to nearly zero. The radii shown in the rest of
the chart remain high, but the optimal policy is not in this region.24
The bottom panel of the chart shows the contours for a modest and conventional value
of funds rate persistence, φr =0 .50. The potholes have now completely disappeared, but
t h el a r g er e dr e g i o ni sl e s sr o b u s tt h a nt h eb u rgundy regions in the previous charts. Not
shown in these charts are still higher levels of persistence. These involve still lower levels of
robustness, with radii for φr > 1 associated with radii that are less than half the magnitude
of the maximum allowable perturbation for this rule. Higher levels of persistence in policy
setting are deleterious for robustiﬁcation of model learnability in inﬂation-forecast based
policy rules.25
Of course these particular results are contingent on the relative weightings for pertur-
23 Since degree of robustness is a function of the model’s eigenvalues and those are non-linear functions
of the parameters of the model and of the learning mechanism, it is not possible to identify the source of
these potholes. That said, it isn’t necessary either. The idea behind the methods described in this paper is
to avoid the pitfalls of nonparametric errors.
24 The presence of the "potholes" in the chart for φr =0 .10, wherein the optimally robust rule is found,
and their near-absence for the chart φr =0 .12 points to another concept of robustness. We assume the
monetary authority knows the structural model. As a result, the economy cannot accidentally fall into one
of the potholes shown in the ﬁgure. A worthwhile extension would be to allow the authority to have doubts
about the structural parameters of the model, in addition to the learning mechanism. However the current
paper is—the ﬁrst in this area—is already ambitious enough and so we leave the issue for future research.
25 We tested φr up to nearly 20. What we found is that the radii fell as φr rose for intermediate levels,
and then rose slowly again for φr À 1.H o w e v e r , f o rn ol e v e lo fφr could we ﬁnd radii that came anywhere
close to the maximum allowable perturbation shown in row (7) of the table.
32Figure 5: Contours of radii for the NKB model, forecast-based rule, selected φr
33Figure 6: Contours of radii for the NKB model, forecast-based rule, selected φr
34bations, captured in W1, and our selection is just one of many that could have been made.
For the numerical experiments, the weightings were set equal to the standard deviations of
the coeﬃcients of a ﬁrst-order VAR for the output gap, inﬂation, the interest rate, and the
natural rate, estimated at the beginning of each experiment using recursive least squares.
This approximates the private sector’s problem, and should give a rough idea of the relative
uncertainties associated with the coeﬃcients of the PLM. Whether using estimated stan-
dard deviations to scale the relative impact of Knightian model uncertainty on the learning
mechanism is proper or desirable can be debated, of course. For now the salient point is
that robustness of learning in the presence of model uncertainty is not the same thing as
choosing the rule parameters for which the E-stable region of a given model is largest.
4 Concluding remarks
We have argued that model uncertainty is a serious issue in the design of monetary policy.
On this score we are in good company. Many authors have advanced that minimizing a
loss function subject to a given model presumed to be known with certainty is no longer
best practice for monetary authorities. Central bankers must also take model uncertainty
and learning into account. Where this paper diﬀers from its predecessors is that we unify
uncertainty about the learning mechanism used by private agents with the steps the monetary
authority can take to address the problem. In particular, we examine a central bank
that designs monetary policy to maximize the possible worlds in which ill-informed private
agents need to learn about their particular world and still allow convergence on the rational
expectations equilibrium.
The motivation for this approach is straightforward: if economics as a profession cannot
agree on what the true model of the economy is, it is a leap of faith to expect private
agents to agree, coordinate, and ﬁnd the REE by themselves. Policy makers can play a
role in facilitating (or frustrating) the process of learning the REE through the design of
policy. This paper begins from the premise that best practice for a monetary authority
using simple instrument rules is to parameterize the rule that provides good performance
35not just in the steady state–that is, when convergence to REE has been achieved–but also
in out-of-equilibrium behavior of the system. We further argue that foremost among the
considerations of what constitutes good out-of-equilibrium behavior of an uncertain system
under learning should be the prospects for converging on an REE.
In pursuit of this goal, this paper has married the literature on adaptive learning to that
of structured robust control to examine what policy makers can do to facilitate learning. We
have introduced some tools with which the questions that Bullard and Mitra [8] are asking
can be broadened and generalized.
More narrowly we have also found that the warnings of Bernanke and Woodford [2] are
well placed; inﬂation-forecast-based monetary policy rules do present dangers. We have also
shown that the conclusion that Bullard and Mitra [8] point to is not as general as one might
initially suppose.
Looking ahead, we see new research directions that broaden the scope of robustness by
addressing a wider range of uncertainties against which a policy maker may wish to protect.
Evans and McGough [21], for example, show how to compute Taylor-type rules that will
converge on an REE in a variety of models, taking the learning mechanism as given, whereas
we take the structural model as given and investigate the implications of misspeciﬁcation of
learning rules. A fusion of the two approaches would seem to be worth investigating.
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